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 1 Introduction
The connection between ﬁnance and economic growth has been the subject of increasing
attention over recent years. The majority of this attention has been on its empirical
aspect, however. Though the implications of the empirical results cannot be taken
without qualiﬁcation, the core messages emanating from this research have been con-
sistent and forceful. It has been shown that the extent of ﬁnancial development in an
economy is related to the level of sustained economic growth.
Work such as King and Levine (1993a) has gone so far as to suggest that we can
draw predictions about the rate of economic growth over ten to thirty years based
on the extent of ﬁnancial depth. Those sorts of implications, and those of succeeding
papers,1 are open to further validation: In short, are they realistic? Driﬃll (2003),
among others, suggests that they are not, partly because of the strength of outliers
(speciﬁcally, the Asian ‘tiger’ economies) in driving the results, and partly because of
the simple implausibility of the predictions. There has been some further dissent,2
but on the whole, as suggested by Beck and de la Torre (2006, p.1), the “causal link
running from ﬁnancial depth to growth has been rather convincingly established.”
At the same time as ﬁnding positive relationships between ﬁnancial development
and economic growth, work such as King and Levine (1993b) seeks to bolster empirical
ﬁndings with the development of theory relating ﬁnancial matters to the determi-
nants of growth. The tacit implication is that the empirical ﬁndings are supported
by, and support, the theoretical results. But while the empirics typically consider
cross-section regressions on aggregate ﬁnancial depth, the theories relate measures of
ﬁnancial eﬃciency to economic growth. In these theories, there is assumed to be some
wedge between savings and investments which acts to reduce the rate of technological
progress or human capital accumulation by dampening entrepreneurial or educational
activities. In order to consider results from each approach as a single body of research,
the connection between these frictions and the level of aggregate depth then needs to
1See, inter alia, Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck et al. (2000) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (2001).
2Such as Manning (2003) and Trew (2006).
1be made explicit.
In this paper we begin to address the absence in the theoretical literature of any
quantitative, and therefore testable, implications. By developing a model that does
have quantitative implications, we can look at the connection between theoretical and
empirical ﬁndings. We calibrate the model to historical data and draw conclusions on
the quantitative performance of the theory.
It will be argued that balanced growth actually implies that the economy needs
to obtain a constant level of ﬁnancial depth. We will see that greater ﬁnancial eﬃ-
ciency, as normally understood, must be associated with lower ﬁnancial depth. But
the theory tells us that growth is increasing in eﬃciency; the data tells us that growth
is increasing in depth. That apparent contradiction can only be resolved if we look
at the connection between eﬃciency and depth. Work such as Rousseau (1998) has
established, theoretically and empirically, a channel through which changes in ﬁnancial
eﬃciency can have a permanent eﬀect on depth. In the context of growth empirics,
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) have also looked at eﬃciency and depth in isolation,
using a speciﬁc natural experiment. That paper argues that, empirically, growth im-
provements arose from increases in eﬃciency, not ﬁnancial deepening. More recently,
Rousseau and Wachtel (2006) consider changes in the relationship between depth and
growth, and show that it does not always exist over time. In general, then, the theory
linking eﬃciency to growth cannot without qualiﬁcation be held to support the nu-
merical implications of empirical work based on depth. Growth, eﬃciency and depth
interact in ways not yet fully accounted for in extant ﬁnance and growth theory.
The empirical literature has moved toward increasingly rich analyses. Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt and Levine (2001) considers the ﬁnance-growth nexus using ﬁrm-level and economy-
wide panel data, while work such as Beck et al. (2005) has looked at the diﬀering impact
of ﬁnancial development on ﬁrm size and growth. A number of papers have also be-
gun to consider factors which determine the eﬃcacy of ﬁnance in inﬂuencing growth.
Beck and Levine (2005) and Bordo and Rousseau (2006) are examples in the context
2of legal origin. Theoretical work3, on the other hand, has continued to focus on the
juxtaposition of cross-sectional econometrics and theory without explicitly assessing
the quantitative connection between them. There is, in this approach, no calibration
of theoretical results to empirical facts, and no attempted simulation of time paths or
cross sections found in the data.
This paper reduces some of the key mechanisms at work in a number of prominent
theories of ﬁnance and growth to a single model that can be calibrated to data. The
simplicity of the resulting model reﬂects the stripped-down nature of our approach.
The intention is to develop quantitative implications which are transparent enough to
allow an interpretation in terms of historical growth paths.
We ﬁrst provide in Section 2 a brief survey of a number of key theoretical contri-
butions, and argue that they can be considered in the context of a small number of
core mechanisms. We develop in Section 3 a simple ﬁnance and endogenous growth
model in the manner of King and Levine (1993b). Section 4 then uses this representa-
tive model to conduct a number of quantitative tests using historical series for growth,
depth, eﬃciency and TFP. Section 5 concludes with our main ﬁndings.
2 The Prevailing Mechanics of Finance and Growth
Theory
Our intention is to reduce the most commonly cited ﬁnance and growth theories down
to their core, laying bare the central mechanisms through which ﬁnance is said to
inﬂuence the rate of economic growth. We do not derive an empirically motivated
theory; we intend only to reﬂect the prevailing state of thought in ﬁnance and growth
theory. In doing this, we will then be in a position to test our representative theory in
the light of its implications for time-series growth paths.
The emergence of the new growth literature has placed the accumulation of technol-
ogy or human capital at the heart of the growth process. It has become straightforward
3With the clear exception of Townsend and Ueda (2006).
3to introduce this or that friction into the intermediate, quality-enhancing sector and so
demonstrate that there can be real consequences for the long-run growth of an econ-
omy. For ﬁnancial matters to have an impact on growth, we need to introduce frictions
between those who save and those who wish to invest. Such frictions motivate the
existence of specialised ﬁnancial structures, the eﬃcacy of which enters into the rate of
human capital or technology accumulation and so has an indirect impact on the level
of sustained growth.
Capasso (2004) and Levine (2005) go through in some detail the nature of a good
deal of the theoretical literature. Microeconomic frictions arise out of the imposition of
at least incomplete but also, more typically, asymmetrical information. Wright (2002)
has also placed asymmetric information at the heart of the historical ﬁnance and growth
narrative.
King and Levine (1993b) is the original ﬁnance and growth model with adverse
selection, in which entrepreneurs are screened by a ﬁnancial intermediary to determine
their quality. The screening is costly, and the chosen entrepreneurs develop better
quality intermediate goods with some known probability. In Bose and Cothren (1996),
banks can choose potential creditors with either a costly screening technology or by
designing a separating contract, or by a mix of the two. Models that motivate ﬁnancial
structures by the presence of moral hazard include Blackburn and Hung (1998) and
Morales (2003). In each there is a post-contract incentive for agents to either deceive
or shirk.
In addition to asymmetric information, the imposition of a simple credit constraint
has been shown to play an important role, though this aspect is only rarely emphasised.
Aghion et al. (2005) demonstrate that imperfect creditor protection can determine the
availability of capital to potential entrepreneurs. This can have a knock-on eﬀect on
growth and, in that model, convergence to the technological frontier. Acemoglu and
Zillibotti (1997) develop a model in which minimum investment requirements mean
that agents cannot always insure against the risk involved in investing in high-return
projects. A series of positive shocks can cause ﬁnancial development and economic
4development to take-oﬀ. The importance of ‘access to ﬁnance’ has formed the backbone
of recent World Bank research in ﬁnance and development. This policy emphasis has
not yet been reﬂected in an analytical synthesis, though Beck and de la Torre (2007)
do suggest some potential directions for future research.
We can draw together some key aspects of the mechanisms underlying predomi-
nant ﬁnance and growth theories. Something akin to entrepreneurship drives the ac-
cumulation of either human capital or greater technologies. The eﬃciency with which
the motive to innovate or accumulate translates into actual growth is determined by
the ease with which entrepreneurs can obtain ﬁnance for their risky projects. With
asymmetric information in the ﬁnancial sector, this eﬃciency is dependent upon the
sophistication of the ﬁnancial technologies such as screening and monitoring. Further,
credit constraints can inhibit the ability of agents to access the ﬁnancial market. As the
economy becomes richer, so it can aﬀord those ﬁnancial structures that better facilitate
higher economic growth.
A recent analysis is that of Townsend and Ueda (2006), which builds on the theory
of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) to include transitional behaviour. They develop
a dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with evolving levels of ﬁnancial
depth and economic inequality. Financial structures exist because of the imposition
of ﬁxed and marginal costs to exchange; i.e., the information problem is not explicit.
They compare the quantitative implications of the model to data from Thailand for
the period 1976-1997.
To reiterate, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the dangers of drawing
conclusions from arguments which omit the sort of direct connection between data and
theory propounded by Townsend and Ueda (op. cit.). A theory of economic growth
and ﬁnancial eﬃciency, however it is motivated, cannot be held to support, and nor
can it be supported by, empirical relationships between measures of aggregate ﬁnancial
depth and economic growth unless connections between depth and eﬃciency are spelled
out.
In Section 3 we develop a model in the spirit of King and Levine (1993b) which links
5ﬁnancial matters to economic growth. The model includes: A role for entrepreneurship
in the accumulation of human capital, as facilitated by the existence of an intermedi-
ating sector; asymmetric information between intermediaries and entrepreneurs in the
form of adverse selection; and constraints on an able agent’s access to ﬁnance. We
invoke a model in which entrepreneurs wish to obtain ﬁnance for investment in their
own human capital, rather than for an addition to technology. It will be clear that
for our purposes the diﬀerence of each approach is minimal. Using this model, we
embark upon some quantitative tests. We draw out the numerical implications of our
representative model using historical series for ﬁnancial depth, TFP, economic growth
and a proxy for eﬃciency.
3 A Representative Model of Finance and Growth
The purpose of this section is to outline a simple version of an endogenous growth
model that can capture the principle mechanics of signiﬁcant theoretical models. We
calibrate the model to historical data for the UK and so trace out the implied ‘transition
path’ for ﬁnancial eﬃciency over the period of the industrial revolution.
The mechanism by which ﬁnance aﬀects long-run growth follows the trend sug-
gested by the theories discussed in Section 2: Ever since King and Levine (1993b),
the majority of theories linking ﬁnance to growth revolve around entrepreneurship and
either human capital accumulation or technological progress. We adopt that perspec-
tive also. In addition, we assume that there can be arbitrary credit constraints. By
appropriately calibrating this model, we will be able, in Section 4, to consider the the-
oretical relationship between depth, eﬃciency and growth in the light of predominant
econometric results.
3.1 Financial Intermediation and Growth
In the model of King and Levine (1993b) intermediaries are eﬀectively venture capi-
talists that have the technology necessary to screen potential entrepreneurs who are
6then employed and given funds to run a research project. The fruit of such labour
is an addition to the stock of knowledge (speciﬁcally, via a quality-ladders setup ` a la
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Post-screening, the intermediary knows with certainty
the ability of the applicant. There is no costly eﬀort (so no moral hazard), and the
intermediary market is perfectly competitive.4 Reductions in the cost of screening or
in the tax on intermediary proﬁts thus increase the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector,
increase the rate of technological progress and so increase the rate of long-run growth.
On top of this cost, we allow for the existence of simple credit constraints: An agent
is not necessarily able to enter the ﬁnancial market.
3.1.1 Outline
In this model ﬁrms demand physical capital and human capital. We have a continuum
of agents in each household of total mass one, and a random distribution of type within
each. If we assume a large number of households then in the aggregate we can work
with the average distribution of type within a given household. So, on average, a
proportion ϕ1 has no ability to acquire human capital whatsoever, a proportion ϕ2 has
low ability Λ0 and the remainder, proportion ϕ3 = 1−ϕ1−ϕ2, has high ability Λ > Λ0.
It is important that able agents do not know their own level of ability, only that they
have some.5 Agents with no ability take household responsibility for selling physical
capital to ﬁrms. Only agents with high ability have the potential to develop human
capital; intermediaries wish to screen potential entrepreneurs before funding them. We
will assume that intermediaries always prefer screening to blind selection.
We suppose that only a proportion, λ, of the agents with some ability can access the
ﬁnancial market; this proportion is independent of agent type. All agents with nonzero
4A related model in Trew (2007) extends that presented here to include moral hazard considerations.
That work also shows that we can model related connections between depth, eﬃciency and growth within
a quality-ladders framework with imperfect competition in intermediate sectors. The usefulness of such a
model for quantitative testing is limited by the additional complexity, however (simply put, there are too
many free parameters). We therefore restrict our attention to the model in which quantitative mechanisms
are most transparent.
5If agents knew their level of ability, given that the screening technology of the intermediary identiﬁes
ability with precision, and given also that agents know this, there would be no reason for those with less
than high-ability to apply.
7ability who also have access to the credit market apply to a ﬁnancial intermediary to
be screened. Those that are rejected do not contribute to household income. Those
that are accepted are consequently funded by the intermediary to acquire education
or conduct research, becoming human capital with ﬁxed probability β. In the case of
education this might reﬂect the likelihood of not dropping-out; in the case of research
this might reﬂect the probability of useful innovation. Either way, we obtain the same
result. Those that fail to develop human capital contribute nothing to household
income, those that do develop human capital are consequently employed by ﬁrms and
enter the production function as human capital. In the event that the agent succeeds
in acquiring human capital it is the researcher that owns the human capital, paying a
proportion t of income from human capital to intermediaries. The intermediary thus
sets t∗ to maximise expected proﬁts.
3.1.2 Firms
Firms use human capital, H, and physical capital, K, as inputs to the production
process, Yt = AKα
t H1−α
t .6 Each ﬁrm maximises proﬁts, πt = Yt − rKt − hHt, where
each takes the rates of return on physical capital, r, and human capital, h as given:
r = α(Yt/Kt) and h = (1 − α)(Yt/Ht). We can use the equation for h to obtain the
ﬁrm’s demand for human capital, Ht = [(1 − α)Yt]/h, which, upon substitution into










Once we have found a relationship between the rates of return on human and physical
capital, we can treat this model as one in which externalities to production are just
enough to generate constant returns and ‘Ak’ growth. Following Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004), we can then think of K as something like a proxy for a composite
6In order to more faithfully reﬂect King and Levine (1993b), we might have thought of entrepreneurs




t . This diﬀerence would not matter for the purposes of our simple numerical simulation.
8capital variable. In doing so, we assume that the H : K ratio is constant. As in most
of the extant theory, transitional dynamics will not exist here.
3.1.3 Intermediaries
The intermediary incurs the cost f(H) > 0 to screen agents for ability and funds
successful applicants to acquire human capital at cost x(H) > 0. Note that these
costs are not necessarily invariant to the level of human capital. We make the initial
assumption that f0 > 0 and x0 > 0, i.e., that the costs of intermediation are increasing
in the size of the demand for human capital. So both the outlay required to fund the
acquisition of human capital, x, and the cost of screening candidate acquirers of human
capital, f, is increasing in the level of human capital – a reasonable assumption if we
imagine that the higher the level of human capital aspired to, the more costly it is to
both fund and identify suitably able agents. We will consider departures from this in
Section 3.2.1.
It is assumed to be better for intermediaries to screen agents than to accept the
average. We also require that it is not feasible for households to fund the amount x(H)
from their own resources. For a given agent, expected intermediary proﬁts will be the
probability-weighted incomes and expenditures. The probability that an agent who
applies will be of low ability is ϕ2/(1 − ϕ1), in which case only the screening cost is
expended. The probability of successfully developing human capital from high-ability
agents and thus obtaining a rent from him is β(1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2)/(1 − ϕ2). If we assume
competition then the expected intermediary proﬁt is zero,
E(π)=λβ

1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
1 − ϕ1

[thH − x(H) − f(H)] +
+λ(1 − β)

1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
1 − ϕ1







[−f(H)] = 0. (2)
9If we specify x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH,7 where ηx > 0 and ηf > 0 are the
cost parameters of intermediation, then we obtain the following expression for the fee













Equation (3) is increasing in the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation, ηf and ηx, and in
the share of low ability agents, ϕ2, and decreasing in both the probability of human
capital creation, β and the share of high ability agents, ϕ3. So t∗ reﬂects the size of
the wedge between those who wish to save and those who wish to borrow ﬁnance.
3.1.4 Households
The cost λt∗hH is borne by consuming households. The household receives income
from physical and human capital, however, at the rates r and h respectively. Using
equation (3), the household budget constraint will thus be the familiar ct + ˙ kt =
rkt+λτ(1−t∗)hH. We mirror King and Levine here by incorporating a tax on income
from innovation, where 1 − τ is the tax rate applied to household income from human







where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility function. If we assume CES preferences of the
form u(ct) = (c1−θ
t −1)/(1−θ), then we obtain the standard Euler equation governing
the growth rate of consumption, ˙ ct/ct = θ−1(r − ρ).
7This means that, simply, we require (ϕ2 + ϕ3)ηf < ϕ2ηx for the case in which intermediaries always
choose to screen. We will consider potential generalisation of these functions in Section 3.2.1.
103.1.5 Equilibrium Growth
In equilibrium we require that the net return on capital is equal to the net return on
human capital, i.e., that r = λτ(1−t∗)h.8 From the production function, equation (1)










By the equilibrium ﬁnancial intermediation condition, h = r/[λτ(1−t∗)], we may solve
for the interest rate,
r = A[λτ(1 − α)(1 − t∗)]1−α. (6)





A[λτ(1 − α)(1 − t∗)]1−α − ρ
	
. (7)
An increase in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, by reducing ηf or ηx ceteris
paribus results in an increase in the equilibrium growth rate by reducing the cost of
intermediation, t∗. So there is simply a wedge in between what ﬁrms pay for human
capital and what agents receive, where the signiﬁcance of this wedge reﬂects the ef-
ﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation. This is the main theoretical result of King and
Levine (1993b).
3.2 Financial Depth and Eﬃciency
We can use this simple model to draw-out a preliminary analysis of ﬁnance and growth
relationships. As noted above, in empirical estimations, measures of ﬁnancial depth are
typically used. By depth is meant some ratio of ﬁnancial throughput to ﬁnal output.
We can think, for example, of receipts to the ﬁnancial intermediary as a proportion of
8This is akin to the argument in Tsiddon (1992): “I assume that each ﬁnancial intermediary can provide
a risk-free return to lenders that is equal to or greater than the risk-free rate of return individuals can earn
in the market for physical capital. Competition guarantees that each ﬁnancial intermediary has zero proﬁt.”
p. 305



















(1 − α)1−αψα, (9)
where ψ = Ht
Kt. Since we know that Ht and Kt will always grow at the same rate, γ,
their ratio will be constant. Plainly, with this measure ﬁnancial depth is increasing in
both ηf and ηx since both serve to increase the perfectly competitive level of t∗, the
cost of ﬁnancial intermediation to agents. In other words, depth is here decreasing in
the level of ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Before going on to consider this further let us look at







(1 − α)1−αψα, (10)







. Of course, using the expression for t∗ we have





t∗ = φtt∗, so Dt = Df,x. Since the intermediary sector is per-
fectly competitive, the two measures of depth are identical: Outgoings as a proportion
of ﬁnal output is the same as incomings as a proportion of ﬁnal output. It is clear that
whichever measure we use (or even a sum of debits and credits to intermediaries as a
proportion of output), we will arrive at the same eﬃciency-depth connection.9
Let us consider the ﬁrst measure of depth, Dt. Equation (9) clariﬁes a tension be-
tween the empirical and theoretical ﬁndings of ﬁnance and growth. In the extant the-
ory, increases in ﬁnancial eﬃciency, however deﬁned, imply greater economic growth.
9As mentioned above, we could extend this model to one that incorporates moral hazard and work with
measures of monitoring costs, etc., as proxies for ﬁnancial eﬃciency. We wish to obtain relatively clear
quantitative implications of this representative model, however, so we focus on only a minimum of variables
for ﬁnancial eﬃciency.
12But those increases in eﬃciency, taken alone, also imply a reduction in ﬁnancial depth
along a balanced growth path. Yet empirically, the level of ﬁnancial depth is typically
taken as a proxy for ﬁnancial development, and regressed against estimates of economic
growth. A positive contemporaneous (and sometime leading) coeﬃcient on ﬁnancial
depth is typically found. The theory and empirics of ﬁnance and growth are, from this
standpoint, apparently incongruous.
Although we typically assume that estimations using depth are meant as proxies
for estimations of ﬁnancial eﬃciency, these ﬁndings are not necessarily contradictory.
Increased depth might result from other factors that also cause growth. The problem
arises where we place theories of eﬃciency alongside the empirics of depth. Further-
more, there is a theoretical literature (which we will come onto below) linking increases
in eﬃciency to increases in the size of the ﬁnancial sector (though not in the conﬁnes
of balanced-growth theories). So we should suspect that there is something missing
from this representative model.
There is another possibility that has been closed oﬀ in this model which might help
us to reconcile these issues: The severity of credit constraints might be a function of
ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Increases in eﬃciency, if they serve to suﬃciently increase access
to credit, might then yield a combination of higher growth and higher depth. We will
come on to this possibility in Section 3.2.2.
It might seem like we could also relate measures of ﬁnancial eﬃciency with tech-
nological progress, via the coeﬃcient A. As it stands, we have human capital-based
endogenous growth; the rate of accumulation reﬂects the costs of ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation. Alternatively, we could have more explicitly considered technological progress
within this set-up (see footnote 6); but this would not serve to modify the requirements
for balanced growth. Within this framework, the parameter A captures exogenous
TFP; endogenous growth, reﬂecting the ﬁnancial eﬃciency conditions, is captured in
the accumulation of human capital.
Before coming to consider the link between eﬃciency and depth, we must consider
how robust this ﬁnding is to alternative functional forms for ﬁnancial costs.
133.2.1 Robustness to Alternative Functional Forms
We have developed what is, in essence, a very stripped-down model of endogenous
growth. We could have been more general, however, in specifying the nature of the
ﬁnancial costs incurred by the intermediary. Suppose that we specify f(H) = h˜ ηf(H)
and x(H) = h˜ ηx(H); so now f and x can be any function of H. We might consider
that ﬁnancial costs rise or fall as a proportion of hH as the economy grows. Using













Quite clearly, by equation (7), balanced growth is not necessarily obtained in this
set-up. For balanced growth, we require t∗ to be constant in H, i.e.,
˜ η0
x(H) − (H)−1˜ ηx(H) +

1 − ϕ1
1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2

[˜ η0
f(H) − (H)−1˜ ηf(H)] = 0, (12)
which, of course, is satisﬁed when we let ˜ ηf(H) = ηfH and ˜ ηx(H) = ηxH. If this
is not the case, to recover balanced growth we could relate the size of the economy






∂H; in other words, increases in ﬁnancial eﬃciency (reductions in t∗) over
time must, for balanced growth, be matched by reductions in access to ﬁnance. This
is the opposite to what we would expect, and moves us further away from reconciling
the eﬃciency-depth connection.
An alternative would be to specify ˜ ηf(H) and ˜ ηx(H) to oﬀset one another in








(H)−1˜ ηf(H)]. The impact on depth is then also neutral, since t∗ is simply invariant
to H in whichever measure of depth we use. There seems no good empirical justiﬁca-
tion for doing this, so we concentrate on the simpler set-up with ˜ ηf(H) = ηfH and
˜ ηx(H) = ηxH.
14In short, balanced growth, ceteris paribus, requires a total ﬁnancial cost of propor-
tionate form; balanced growth implies constant ﬁnancial depth.10
3.2.2 Eﬃciency, Depth and Access
Let us return to the case with ˜ ηf(H) = ηfH and ˜ ηx(H) = ηxH. Suppose that the
proportion of agents that can access credit is a function of a measure of ﬁnancial
eﬃciency, say λ = λf(ηf) with λ0
f < 0. Rousseau (1998) establishes a theoretical link
between the degree of adverse selection in ﬁnancial intermediation and ﬁnancial depth
by showing that it can determine the size of the pool of applicants. This channel is
similarly developed in Aghion et al. (2005), where the degree of creditor protection
(taken to be a proxy of ﬁnancial eﬃciency) is related to credit constraints, and so
also to the size of the ﬁnancial sector. In the context of growth theory, Greenwood
and Jovanovic (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) demonstrate channels through
which greater ﬁnancial sophistication eventually yields greater use of ﬁnancial services.
Rousseau (1998) also supports this relationship empirically, using measures of interest
rate spreads to proxy ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Using unobservable components models, it
is found that a 1% reduction in the loan-deposit spread is associated with increases of
between 1.7 and 3.8% in long-run measures of ﬁnancial depth.
For the purposes of this paper, let us simply posit a relationship between ﬁnancial
eﬃciency and access to ﬁnance. We can then consider, in quantitative terms, the
importance of this linkage in reconciling eﬃciency-depth considerations of ﬁnance and
growth. Using (9) with λ = λf(ηf) we have,
∂Dt
∂ηf


























10There is an analogous requirement for balanced growth in a quality-ladders setup (see Trew, 2007).
15The eﬀect of ηf on λ has to be suﬃciently negative to outweigh the upward pressure of










1 + α(1 − t∗)−1
. (15)
Of course, this does not yield a direct comparison to the empirical relationship found
in papers such as Rousseau (1998). We can think of changing ηf as changes in the
interest rate spread, because t∗ is essentially a wedge between what savers receive and
what borrowers pay. But λf is not depth; inequality (15) is the condition under which
increases in eﬃciency also increase depth via the credit channel. The elasticity of depth
















1 + α(1 − t∗)−1
. (16)
This equation makes clear the conﬂicting tendencies of greater eﬃciency to both reduce
the costs of intermediation and increase the pool of credit applicants. The overall eﬀect
of changes in eﬃciency on growth are monotonic; the eﬀect on depth is ambiguous. If
increases in eﬃciency cause large increases in the applicant pool relative to decreases
in intermediary costs then eﬃciency and depth will both be positively associated with
growth. If the eﬀect on intermediary costs dominates, however, this relation will not
hold. Though an eﬃciency-growth relation will always exist, the standard eﬃciency-
depth-growth relation may not.
We can now proceed to consider the quantitative implications of our representative
model in the light of empirical estimates of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial eﬃciency on depth.
164 Quantitative Implications of the Representa-
tive Model
We wish to calibrate our representative model and use historical measures of economic
growth, ﬁnancial depth, total factor productivity and ﬁnancial eﬃciency (such as loan-
deposit spreads) to tests its explanatory power under various assumptions. Using such
data, we can consider whether our candidate ﬁnance and growth model holds up: How
closely can it capture actual changes in growth, eﬃciency and depth? We can also
consider the importance of the eﬃciency-depth mechanism suggested in Section 3.2.2.
Such data requirements necessitate that we restrict our focus to a relatively short
historical period. For the UK we look at the period 1850-1913. Detail of data sources
and construction is given in Appendix Section A. Data for growth and TFP can be
obtained with conﬁdence from Crafts and Harley (1992) and Crafts (1995). A series for
ﬁnancial depth across 1880–1929 is also available, as in Rousseau and Wachtel (1998).
We use this data to estimate the trend rate of change in the level of ﬁnancial depth
prior to 1880. Figures 1 and 2 depict the series we use.
Figure 1: (a) Trend Economic Growth and (b) TFP
Clearly there is a great deal of change in economic growth, even when we extract
17Figure 2: Financial Depth
the trend component. Over the period, the general trend in growth is downwards,
however. The trend in TFP, however, is plainly upwards. Financial depth is also
trending upwards over the period. This runs against what we would expect to be the
case given the trend in growth. Since the Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) series for depth
begins in 1880, we cannot be certain about the level of depth prior to 1880. Instead
we note that the trend rate of change in depth appears to be stable; we depict three
potential trends for depth: First, using the high rate of change from 1880–1890; second,
using the lower rate of change across 1880–1913; third, an average of the ﬁrst two. This
approach is supported by data in Collins (1984), which covers English banking for the
period 1840–80. The trend in the ratio of Commercial Bank Deposits to Industrial
Output using this data is very close the estimate using the low rate of change in Figure
2 – details are in the appendix. Of course, these data are not fully compatible with
that in Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), so we take them only as indicative support for
our method.
There are only a few options for a ﬁnancial eﬃciency measure over this period in
the UK. We construct two proxies here: The ﬁrst is a loan-deposit spread at the Bank
18of England derived from Mitchell (1988); the second is the proﬁtability of the London
Westminster Bank using data in Gregory (1936). Details of data sources and their
manipulation are in the appendix. Broadly speaking, we suppose that the interest rate
spread is negatively related to ﬁnancial eﬃciency and that the bank proﬁtability is
positively related to ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Both measures allow us to consider, in the
manner of Rousseau (1998), the trend in ﬁnancial eﬃciency. Figure 3 depicts the raw
series and the Hodrick-Prescott trend. We will be using the trend series as our measures
of eﬃciency.
Figure 3: (a) Bank Loan-Deposit Spread and (b) London Westminster Proﬁtability
Each of our candidate ﬁnancial eﬃciency measures in Figure 3 suggests a similar
trend: The Bank loan-deposit spread increased over the period; the net proﬁtability of
the London Westminster Bank fell. Further, the cyclical movements around this trend
match up in a few periods. In other words, both of our proxies suggest that ﬁnancial
eﬃciency fell over the period in question. Of course, we are making the assumption
that ﬁnancial eﬃciency, as we mean it in the theory, is positively related to bank
proﬁtability and inversely related to bank spreads. The implied trend in eﬃciency
might seem surprising; but we shall see that this ﬁts in to our representative model of
ﬁnance and growth.
19We can now conduct a number of quantitative experiments. First, can we match
growth rates given observed changes in ﬁnancial depth and ﬁnancial eﬃciency? Second,
can we capture the trend in depth by calibrating the model to observed eﬃciency
estimates? In doing this, we can also consider the role of a positive eﬃciency-depth
relationship in the model extension of Section 3.2.2.
4.1 Can we match growth rates given observed depth and
eﬃciency changes?
Let us deﬁne the coeﬃcient of technological progress as A = a ˆ A where a is some
constant and ˆ A is our estimate of TFP. Similarly, let the cost of screening be ηf = f1ˆ ηf1
where f1 is some constant and ˆ ηf1 is our estimate of ﬁnancial eﬃciency from the
Bank loan-deposit spread. The second measure of eﬃciency, the London Westminster
proﬁtability, should be inversely related to the cost ηf; so let ηf = f2(¯ ηf2 − ˆ ηf2) where
ˆ ηf2) is our second measure of eﬃciency and where f2 and ¯ ηf2 are constants. In order
















where ˆ t∗ evolves according to equation (3). We also require that ˆ λt ∈ (0,1]. It should be
noted that this is the opposite to the standard depth-growth relation; here changes in




Our indirect estimates of the credit constraint come from estimated changes in ﬁ-
nancial depth which, combined with our estimates for TFP and eﬃciency, will generate









We choose parameters a, f1, f2, β, ϕ1 and ϕ2 in order to obtain a best ﬁt and
20set α, θ and ρ to standard values. The value for ¯ ηf2 is simply ﬁxed at some number
greater than max{ˆ ηf2}. For these simulations we will let τ = 1. The calibration for
each simulation is given in Table 1.11
Table 1: Calibrations for the Model of Growth and Depth
I II III IV
capital share α 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
elasticity of substitution θ 5 5 5 5
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
likelihood of success β 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
proportion of zero ability ϕ1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
proportion of low ability ϕ2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
coeﬃcient on TFP a 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
coeﬃcient on screening f1 2.5 . 2.5 .
coeﬃcient on screening f2 . 1.5 . 1.5
screening parameter ¯ ηf2 . 0.02 . 0.02
parameter on ﬁnancial investment ηx 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
credit constraint parameter λ . . 0.01 0.01
Figure 4 shows the model implications for growth using, in panel (a), the Bank
measure for eﬃciency (Calibration I) and, in panel (b), the proﬁtability measure (Cal-
ibration II). We use the 1880–1913 trend for ﬁnancial depth back to 1850 since this is
closest to the trend suggested in Collins (1984).
The model performance in matching growth rates is generally good. The eﬃciency
measure derived from the Bank rate spread performs well over the period, capturing the
downward trend in growth and some of the cyclical movement. The measure derived
from the London Westminster Bank proﬁtability performs less well; implied cycles in
growth are opposite to those observed in the data. But the implied growth rate does
trend downwards. Overall, to some extent we succeed in capturing changes in trend
growth. This is not despite but because of the presence of a negative relationship
between ﬁnancial eﬃciency and depth in our model. As noted above, the trend in
depth over the period was upwards, while that of growth was downwards. So the
11The model implications are generally robust to changes in parameter values. Though we choose values
here to best ﬁt the levels of growth, simulated movements in growth and depth are very robust.
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positive relationship between ﬁnancial eﬃciency and growth holds up; that between
ﬁnancial depth and growth does not. Recent work by Rousseau and Wachtel (2006)
has also suggested that this may indeed be the case.
4.2 Do we match ﬁnancial depth given observed eﬃciency?
We can make the point about the relationship with ﬁnancial depth more clearly by
deriving the levels of ﬁnancial depth which are implied by observed eﬃciency and
TFP values. Using equation (9), we can solve for implied depth from estimates of
TFP and eﬃciency. Figure 5 shows results for the Bank loan-deposit spread (panel
(a), Calibration III in Table 1) and the London Westminster proﬁtability (panel (b),
Calibration IV ). Clearly, our estimates of eﬃciency and TFP enable us to match the
data on depth very closely.
Suppose instead that we impose a relationship between eﬃciency and the credit
constraint that would result in a positive depth-growth relationship. Consider the
model in which the credit constraint is determined endogenously, as in Section 3.2.2.
We wish to consider the elasticity of depth with respect to ﬁnancial eﬃciency, equation
22Figure 5: Modelling Financial Depth with Eﬃciency and TFP
(16). By imposing this relationship, we capture the channel through which increased
eﬃciency leads to increased depth via its eﬀect on the credit constraint.
But it turns out that we cannot simultaneously match a meaningful negative elas-
ticity12 between depth and eﬃciency while also matching growth rates. This should
not be surprising. The ﬁt between the model and the data in Figure 5 is good. When
we impose a very diﬀerent relationship between eﬃciency and depth, we are able to
match estimates of neither depth nor growth. We are led to conclude that a model in
which we do not impose that eﬃciency and depth are positively correlated is the one
which best ﬁts the data.
5 Conclusion
We have found some support for the view that ﬁnancial eﬃciency plays a part in
the level of trend growth in an economy. We developed a representative ﬁnance and
growth model incorporating such an eﬃciency-growth channel and showed that its
numerical implications are broadly in line with the data. The interaction between
12I.e., one even barely in accordance with estimations such as those of Rousseau (1998).
23growth, eﬃciency and depth is less straightforward, however. The theoretical model
allowed us to identify the channel through which increases in eﬃciency can increase
depth at the same time as growth; but we have also seen that this relies upon credit-
eﬀects dominating. The quantitative ﬁndings of our model support the view that a
positive depth-growth link is absent.
How can we reconcile this with the consistent ﬁnding that depth is associated with
increased growth? It may be that the ﬁnance and growth relationship is not a static
one over time, but that it changes as the economy develops or for other, exogenous,
reasons. The strength of the credit-channel, through which increases in eﬃciency lead
to increases in depth, might simply be insuﬃcient over the current period of study.
But the fact that this is so clearly the case suggests that empirical estimations of the
depth-growth link, across time and across countries, might not be the best foundation
from which to draw policy implications.
We have not presented an econometric model of ﬁnance and growth. Were we to do
so, we may indeed ﬁnd some positive correlation between depth and growth. But within
the conﬁnes of a theory of endogenous growth, we can only draw conclusions from
relationships which are deﬁned within the model. The connection between eﬃciency
and depth must be explicit. The best model of ﬁnance and growth is one which departs
from the depth-causes-growth result common in most empirical literature. Reconciling
the diﬀerence between what econometric results consistently ﬁnd, and what is possible
in a model of ﬁnance and growth, is a subject for future research.
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A Data Appendix
Economic Growth. We use here the ‘revised best guess’ from Crafts and Harley (1992,
Table A3.I) for the industrial production series. This is a standard reference for such
data, and it shows a similar pattern to that in Bairoch (1982). The advantage of
the Crafts and Harley dataset is that they provide annual values. We de-trend the
output series across the entire period of their data, using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with
λ = 100, before deriving the trend growth rate for 1850–1913.
Total Factor Productivity. We take the growth rates of TFP from Crafts (Table 2)
and normalise to 1900=1.
Financial Depth. We use a standard measure of ﬁnancial depth, the ratio of total
ﬁnancial institutions assets to national output; see Rousseau and Wachtel (1998, Table
1). We linearly interpolate between data values and extend the series back to 1850
using the trend rate of change from both 1880–1890 and 1880–1913. We also give in
the paper an unweighted average between the two trend lines. All three lines are shown
in Figure 2. We also calculate an estimate for ﬁnancial depth prior to 1880 using data
in Collins (1984). We scale the ratio of Commercial Bank Deposits (Collins, Table 1)
to Industrial Output (Crafts and Harley, Table A3.I) so that it is comparable to the
Rousseau and Wachtel data. We thus identify that the actual trend in ﬁnancial depth
might not be too far from our estimate with the 1880–1913 trend.
Financial Eﬃciency. The ﬁrst measure of eﬃciency takes daily changes in the
Bank Rate/Minimum Lending Rate from Mitchell (1988, Table ‘Financial Institutions
14’) and averages across each year for the period 1850–1925. We subtract from the
lending rate annual averages in the Rates for Three Months’ Bank Bills (op. cit., Ta-
ble ‘Financial Institutions 15.B’). We extract the trend from the resulting series using
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with λ = 100. The second measure of eﬃciency is calculated
27from data in Gregory (1936, pp. 304–7). For a consistent measure we use only data
from the London and Westminster Bank over the period 1850–1908. Our measure of
proﬁtability takes the ratio of Net Proﬁts to the sum of consistently available asset
series: Cash in Hand and at Bank; Money at Call and Short Notice; Loans and Dis-
counts; and, the sum of Investments. We ﬁnd the trend component in the same way
as before.
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